The agency of liminality: army wives in the DR Congo and the tactical reversal of militarization by Eriksson Baaz, Maria & Verweijen, Judith
	 1	
The Agency of Liminality: Army Wives in the DR Congo and the 
Tactical Reversal of Militarization 
 
Published online first in Critical Military Studies (2016), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/23337486.2016.1201979	 
 
Maria Eriksson Baaza and Judith Verweijenb  
a) School of Global Studies, University of Gothenburg; the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala 
b) Conflict Research Group, Ghent University, Ghent; the Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The inherently unstable boundaries between military and civilian worlds have emerged as 
a main object of study within the field of critical military studies. This article sheds light 
on the (re)production of these boundaries by attending to a group that rarely features in the 
debates on the military/civilian divide: army wives in a ‘non-Northern’ context, more 
specifically the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Drawing upon the ‘analytical 
toolbox’ of governmentality, we explore how civilian and military positionalities are 
called upon, articulated and subverted in the governing and self-governing of Congolese 
army wives. We show the decisive importance of these wives’ civilian-military ‘in-
betweenness’ both in efforts to govern them and in their exercise of agency, in particular 
the ways in which they ‘tactically reverse’ militarization. The article also demonstrates the 
dispersed nature of the governing arrangements surrounding army wives, highlighting the 
vital role of ‘the civilian’ as well as the ‘agency of those being militarized’ within 
processes of militarization. By demonstrating the relevance of studying Congolese army 
wives and militarization with an analytical toolbox often reserved for so called ‘advanced 
militaries/societies’, and by revealing numerous similarities between the Congolese and 
‘Northern’ contexts, the article also sets out to counter the Euro/US-centrism and 
‘theoretical discrimination’ that mark present-day (critical) military studies. 
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Introduction  
 
The construction and reproduction of boundaries between military and civilian 
statuses and worlds is the object of growing attention in a range of disciplines. This 
includes the field of critical military studies, which is marked by a ‘prioritization (of) 
the “in-between” – the neither exclusively military nor singularly civilian’ (Basham, 
Belkin and Gifkins 2015, 1). One group that rarely features in these debates – as 
within military studies in general – is army spouses. Given this group’s complex in-
between position between civilian and military spheres, this relative neglect is rather 
surprising. Since army wives’ ambiguous position can be conceptualized as ‘not at the 
margins of the military institution, but rather at the centre of anything called the 
military/civilian divide’ (Hyde 2015, 51), studying this group can offer a useful route 
into exploring the constantly shifting boundaries between the inside and outside of 
military institutions and worlds.  
 
This article attends to army wives in the war-torn Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC). Drawing upon the Foucaldian ‘analytical toolbox’ of governmentality (Rose, 
O’Malley, and Valverde 2006, 100), it sets out to explore how the liminal 
positionality of army wives is called upon, articulated and resisted in their governing 
and self-governing, as reflected in their subjectification. By highlighting the dispersed 
and dual civilian/military nature of the governing arrangements (re)producing the 
militarization of army wives, the article draws attention to the context-specific and 
open-ended nature of processes of militarization. Moreover, it elucidates the 
importance of the agency of ‘those being militarized’, in particular how they may 
‘tactically reverse’ their militarization. As such, it contributes to the emerging debates 
within critical military studies on army wives, militarization and the (re)production of 
civilian/military boundaries (e.g.  Gray 2015, 2016; Hyde 2015; Wool 2015).  
 
By querying into the (self)governing of army wives within one particular context in 
‘the Global South’, we also seek to counter the Euro/US-centrism of  (critical) 
military studies,  (sub)fields that engage only in a limited manner - and highly 
selectively - with military institutions in ‘other parts of the world’. Moreover, ‘more 
traditional’ military studies tend to heavily draw upon colonial and racial lexicons, 
portraying ‘non-Northern’ armies as a ‘totally different species’ (read: primitive, 
unprofessional, and dysfunctional), which allows for the construction of an image of 
‘Northern’ armies as ‘professional’ and ‘(post-)modern’ (Barkawi 2012; Eriksson 
Baaz and Stern 2008). While such colonial imagery is largely absent in critical 
military studies, which has provided much insight into the politics of race in military 
settings (e.g. Basham 2013; Henry 2012), the field engages only sparingly with 
military institutions outside the ‘Global North’, being heavily focused on armed 
forces in so called ‘advanced liberal democracies’. Moreover, both more conventional 
and more critical military scholars tend to study ‘Other armies’ and processes of 
militarization in ‘Other contexts’ with different theoretical lenses and analytical tools. 
This is problematic since it amounts to a form of ‘theoretical discrimination’, which 
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in turn contributes to the reproduction of a colonially scripted distinction between 
‘civilized/developed’ vs. ‘uncivilized/underdeveloped’ spaces, as if certain conceptual 
notions and analytical frameworks are ‘too sophisticated’ for (supposedly) 
‘underdeveloped’ contexts. By employing an analytical toolbox (i.e. governmentality) 
that is rarely used in research on the military sphere (and other phenomena; see 
Walter 2012) in the ‘Global South’ and by outlining similarities between the 
Congolese and other contexts, we hope to counter the ‘Othering’ that is explicitly or 
implicitly present in much of the literature on armies and militarization in so-called 
‘developing’ countries.  
 
The article proceeds as follows. First, we position ourselves within the literature on 
army wives, civilian/military liminality and militarization. Next, we briefly sketch the 
context in which Congolese army wives are situated and discuss the methods and 
methodology employed for this study. In the subsequent section, we explore the ways 
in which the military and civilians in the DRC are engaged in the governing of army 
wives, which is followed by an analysis of how these wives are produced/produce 
themselves through and beyond the civilian and military efforts at governing them. 
We end with a number of reflections on the nature of militarization and our own 
failures in attaining our postcolonial ambition to counter ‘Northern’ centrism. 
 
 
 
Army wives, civilian/military boundaries, and militarization   
 
Reflecting the familiar gendered lexicon of militarization and war, which is often 
manifested in obscuring the contribution of women (e.g. DeGroot 2000; Enloe 1989, 
2000), research on army wives occupies a marginal space in both more ‘traditional’ 
and more critical military studies. Moreover, the thematic engagement within research 
on army wives has been highly selective. Not surprisingly, mainstream military 
studies have queried mostly  into the impact of arrangements with military spouses 
and families on operational effectiveness (e.g. Bowling and Sheriman 2008; Bourg 
and Segal 1999; Segal 1986). Critiquing (yet inevitably and unwillingly also 
somehow contributing to) this instrumental focus, another strand in the literature 
examines the various forms of military-related or induced labor enacted by military 
wives (e.g. Enloe 2000; Harrell 2001), highlighting their crucial, but often little 
visible contributions to military functioning. For instance, Wool and Messinger 
(2012) analyse the ways in which army wives’ care-giving of family members often 
places them in a grey zone where distinctions between ‘labors of love’ and 
‘institutionally compensated work’ are instrinsically blurred. This reflects a growing 
focus within the field of military studies on the construction and blurring of 
civilian/military and public/private boundaries, and how these processes relate to the 
dynamic interplay between army wives’ positionalities, subject positions and agency 
(Hyde 2015; Wool 2015). Examples of such work are Gray’s (2015, 2016) analyses of 
army wives’ narratives of domestic abuse, which foreground the fluid and complex 
	 4	
enactments of public/private distinctions in the Bristish army, and Hyde’s (2015) 
exploration of the everyday practices through which the military institution affects 
subjectivities.  
 
Drawing on this literature, we explore how complex, liminal civilian/military 
positionalities and subjectivities are played out in the governing and self-governing of 
Congolese army wives, conceptualizing ‘governing’ as the structuring of ‘the possible 
field of action of others’ (and self) (Foucault 1982, 790). To that end, we analyse how 
army wives are ‘called upon’ (Hall 1996) in processes of governing and how they, as 
subjects, are produced/produce themselves through (and outside) such processes, 
(re)creating the conditions of their liminality. Hence, we attend to the relationally 
constituted field of power in which military wives are situated and the forms of  
‘governmentality’ this field (re)produces, mapping the ensemble of ‘institutions, 
procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics’ which, in continual 
interplay, are at work in their governing and self-governing (Foucault 2004, 111). In 
particular, we focus on how this (self-)governing is affected by ‘militarization’, here 
conceptualized as a form of governmentality that (re)produces the power of military 
rationalities, discourses, knowledges, and practices. This prompts us to study 
processes of ‘subjectification’ or army wives’ (ongoing) constitution as subject both 
in terms of self-identification/self-knowledge and as being subject to power (Foucault 
1982). Yet the effects of the interplay between subjectification and technologies and 
techniques of government1 are never predetermined; they are mediated via contingent 
processes of translation, interpretation and negotiation, which are shaped by the 
agency of those involved. However, studying ‘the agency of being governed’ 
(Hansson and Hellberg 2015) is particularly challenging, since it is ‘impossible to 
carve out cleanly a particular governing technology and draw a causal and direct 
relation to a technology of the self’ (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2015, 113). As such, we 
recognize the impossibility of tracing the agency of army wives as distinct from the 
governing technologies that produce them. Moreover, our understanding of agency 
locates it not simply in resistance, but also in compliance (see Hansson and Hellberg 
2011 for further discussion). Consequently, the agency of army wives is here 
understood as not only limited to instances where they resist rules or assigned subject 
positions, but applying also when they enact or appropriate them. 
 
By conceptualizing militarization as a form of governmentality, we draw attention to 
how it is driven by dispersed arrangements of government which affect technologies 
of the self in complex and ambiguous manners, implying it is an open-ended process 
that is co-constituted by ‘the agency of those being militarized’. This stands in 
contrast to interpretations of militarization that presuppose a relatively straightforward 																																																								
1 Following Walters (2012), we approach technologies as the overarching rationales or logics at play in 
processes of governing, while techniques of government are conceptualized as the practices that 
operationalize governing technologies.  	
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connection between sets of beliefs and practices emanating from ‘the military 
institution’ and/or the ‘military-industrial complex’ on the one hand, and (militarized) 
‘technologies of the self’ on the other (cf. Enloe 2000), as if the ‘micro-physics’ of the 
‘disciplinary power’ of the military institution were transposed onto the ‘macro-
physics’ of governing populations (cf. Allen 2003, 75). Implicitly or explicitly, such 
interpretations of militarization sometimes assume that the process is primarily driven 
by the governing efforts of the armed forces and that these are somehow (almost) 
always effective. This renders militarization inherently instrumental to the power and 
functioning of military institutions (e.g. Lutz 2001), often resembling functionalist 
reasoning. By contrast, when seen as emerging from the complex and contingent 
interplay between a range of disparate elements, militarization does not only/primarily 
emanate from the armed forces. In the context of this paper, both military wives and 
(other) civilians are agents of militarization, the former by taking on military 
subjectivities and the latter by constructing and engaging, in various ways, with army 
wives ‘as military’. Furthermore, the military’s efforts to govern cannot be assumed 
to be inherently successful in propelling militarization and increasing its power. In 
fact, militarization can undermine the military’s power, such as when militarized 
discourses and knowledges reinforce the position of non-state armed actors or 
civilians vis-à-vis the military. In the present paper, the power of the armed forces as 
institution is, for instance, threatened when army wives publicly denounce and contest 
the military (for example when highlighting their crucial contributions to military 
functioning), even while they do so based on their status ‘as military’, in turn 
reflecting their militarization.  
 
Hence, conceptualizing militarization as a relational effect produced by a 
heterogeneous field of power renders the study of what may be termed ‘the civilian 
world’ (taken as the non-military) crucial for understanding the process, including the 
militarization of army wives (cf. Wool 2015). Arguably, recognizing the socially 
constructed nature of the boundaries between ‘military’ and ‘civilian(s)’, which partly 
overlap with a public/private distinction that collapses in a governmentality 
perspective, implies recognizing that ‘the military’ is always constructed through and 
out of the non-military, or ‘the civilian’ (cf. Mitchell 1991). Another implication of 
conceptualizing militarization as a form of governmentality is that this approach, 
through its emphasis on the contingent outcomes of pluriform and dispersed 
governing arrangements, complicates efforts to generalize the mechanisms, contents, 
and effects of militarization across contexts. As argued by a range of scholars, some 
work on militarism/militarization– particularly when applied to attendant concepts 
such as ‘masculinities’- problematically assumes that militarized norms, ideals and 
subjectivities take everywhere the same form (cf. Higate 2003; Kirby and Henry 
2012). However, processes of militarization are constructed within specific time-
space contexts, reflecting and co-constituting particular histories, imageries, and 
geographies (Woodward 2004, 4), which are also gendered in specific ways. As 
concluded by Bernazolli and Flint (2009, 395), ‘the social construction of place and 
the social processes of militarization are entwined’. 
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Situating Congolese army wives 
 
As a place-specific process, the militarization of Congolese army wives must be 
understood in relation to the historically shaped meanings, rationalities and everyday 
practices associated with and enacted by the armed forces in the DRC. Consequently, 
militarization hinges upon and (re)produces representations of ‘the military’ and 
‘soldiers’ developed over the longue durée, which translate into particular social 
categorizations and stereotyped imagery. In contrast to contexts where the military is 
primarily associated with war-fighting and warriorism, in the DRC, these images 
strongly relate to illicit and coercive forms of revenue generation and power abuse to 
obtain personal gains. As detailed elsewhere (Verweijen 2015), such stereotypical 
imagery is reproduced, but also subverted, through everyday interactions between the 
military and civilians. The latter tend to distinguish between ‘the military in general’, 
conceptualized at a high level of abstraction and mostly imbued with negative 
connotations, and the specific military units and soldiers deployed in their everyday 
environment, to whom they often attribute more positive characteristics. This is 
important to note since the (self) governing of army wives heavily draws upon 
imputing to these women the same values, rationalities and practices that are 
associated with the military/soldiers. At the same time, everyday interactions and 
experiences may subvert these representations, therefore complicating processes of 
militarization. 
 
Aside from through sedimented representations of the military held by civilians, 
processes of militarization, and how they affect the (self)governing of army wives, are 
shaped by the forms, functioning, and discourses of the military organization itself, 
the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique du Congo (FARDC). The FARDC 
was created after a negotiated settlement adopted in 2003, which paved the way for 
the merging of the fighting forces of the different belligerents of the Second Congo 
War (1998–2003) into a new national army. The army today consists of 125,000–
145,000 personnel, around half of whom are deployed to the Kivu provinces in the 
east, which are a hotbed of armed group activity.  
 
Similar to armed forces elsewhere (e.g. Gray 2015), the Congolese defense 
establishment recognizes army wives as part of the military community. Spouses and 
children are allowed to live in barracks, and the families of officers are formally 
entitled to certain benefits, as stipulated in the Law on the Statute of FARDC 
Personnel. This Law recognizes family allocations (art.126), military families’ rights 
to free health care (art.134) and allocations for transport costs when officers are 
redeployed (art. 147). However, reflecting the troubled workings of the Congolese 
state apparatus in general (Trefon 2009), none of these stipulations is currently 
implemented. Like their husbands, who receive derisory wages and are faced with 
abominable service conditions, army spouses have to ‘fend for themselves’, bearing 
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the costs of healthcare, accommodation, and travel largely themselves. Thus, military 
families, in particular of lower ranking personnel, often belong to the poorest strata of 
Congolese society (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2008).  
 
A similar discrepancy between official policy and the situation on the ground exists in 
relation to the presence of army wives in operational zones, where soldiers engage in 
combat operations. Officially, army wives are not allowed to follow their husbands 
into such zones, since it violates the policy of mouvement sans famille. However, in 
practice, numerous military families can be found near the frontlines, where they live 
either in makeshift camps or in rented civilian houses together with their 
husbands/fathers. One reason for this is that both army wives and their husbands fear 
what they commonly name ‘forced divorce’–that is, not seeing each other for many 
years, due to the limited possibilities to travel and obtain leave. In the light of the 
constant state of war and military operations, commanders are reluctant to grant 
soldiers extended periods of leave. Therefore, and given the dilapidated state of the 
road and rail systems as well as the high costs of travelling by air, it is for many 
soldiers simply impossible to visit their family within the allocated time, especially 
when the latter lives hundreds of kilometres away (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 
2016).   
 
Another reason why transgressions of the policy of mouvement sans famille are 
frequent is that the policy is not actively enforced, although this highly differs per 
military region and commander. This half-hearted enforcement reflects the deeply 
ambiguous position of the military hierarchy vis-à-vis military wives. On the one 
hand, reflecting modes of reasoning that originated in the colonial era (Flament 1952), 
commanders are tolerant as they believe that soldiers behave better and are more 
obedient when their wives are around. Furthermore, by providing a range of crucial 
logistical and support tasks (see further below), such as transporting soldiers’ 
belongings on rotations, army wives compensate for the shortage of available 
resources in the military. On the other hand, the presence of army wives is often 
described as hampering operational effectiveness by providing distraction, including 
during attacks on army camps, when soldiers’ first impulse is to bring their families to 
safety. These perceived disadvantages reinforce commitment, at least in official 
military discourse, to enforce official policy and keep army wives out. However, such 
formal discourse should also be seen in the light of the institutional stakes in not 
openly admitting violations of the rules, leading to denials that military families are 
present in/close to operational zones (interviews with FARDC officers, 2006–2016). 
Hence, there are substantial discrepancies between official and unofficial discourses 
and practices vis-à-vis army wives, reflecting the often uncomfortable ambivalence of 
military establishments towards military families and the private sphere that can also 
be found in other contexts (e.g Gray 2015; 2016). 
 
As most infantry brigades and regiments deployed to the east change location 
approximately every 1–2 years, the lives of army wives following their husbands are 
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marked by recurrent relocations. Such unmooring generally entails the weakening of 
ties with prior social networks, including the family in the region of 
origins/upbringing. At the same time, because of frequent displacement and the 
stigmas associated with being an army wife (as explained in the following), 
developing new relations within the civilian environment tends to be difficult. 
Consequently, army wives often stay strongly attached to the military unit of their 
husband and the associated spouses, which form their primary social network. The 
nomadic existence and status of outsider also circumscribe the economic activities 
that army wives can engage in. Given that their husbands’ salary–between US $100–
175 a month, depending on rank–does not suffice to make ends meet, most military 
spouses engage in revenue-generation activities that are common to the Congolese 
‘survival economy’, often using a part of their spouses’ wages as initial investment. 
These activities include day laboring (e.g. doing laundry or cleaning houses); charcoal 
production; hair dressing; sex work; selling self-made foodstuffs and drinks; and 
small-scale, large-scale and transborder trade in a vast range of items, such as 
cigarettes, vegetables, second-hand clothing, or cannabis (Eriksson Baaz and 
Verweijen 2016). The additional income gained in this manner is crucial for the social 
reproduction of the household, even though many military families still do not 
manage to send all their children to school or stay in good health due to a poor diet 
and limited access to healthcare.   
 
In sum, the Congolese military and army wives are caught in an ambivalent 
relationship where each needs the other for their own reproduction. This mutual 
dependency is underpinned by a highly gendered division of labour that draws on, and 
helps construct, public/private and civilian/military divides that render army wives’ 
contributions invisible and unacknowledged. As further highlighted below, this feeds 
into sentiments among army wives that they ‘do not exist’ for the military, even 
though they perform crucial tasks in the face of adverse conditions. 
 
Notes on collecting the narratives 
 
This article is mainly based on interviews conducted in October 2014 among military 
spouses and other civilians in various towns and villages in the territory of Uvira, in 
South Kivu province. Together with our local research partner CIRESKI, 2  we 
interviewed in total 75 army wives, both individually and in groups, in Lingala or 
Swahili, without interpreters. Yet the article also heavily draws on material and 
insights obtained through years of previous ethnographic research among personnel of 
the Congolese armed forces and the civilians with whom they interact conducted for a 
																																																								
2 CIRESKI (Centre Indépendant de Recherches et d’Études Stratégiques au Kivu) is an NGO  
specialized in conducting research based in Uvira. 
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variety of other research projects.3 
While no conscious decision was made to focus only on female spouses, no (civilian) 
male spouses were encountered in the research sites. This is likely related to the fact 
that this group is very small due to the low proportion of female army personnel 
(around 3.2 % in 2016), their tendency to marry other military, and the non existence 
of official same-sex partnerships. The majority of the interviews were conducted with 
women in longer term partnerships with rank-and-file soldiers and lower ranking 
officers, most of whom continually follow their partners to their various deployment 
sites. The poor living conditions of this group contrast with those of the wives of 
superior officers, who are often relatively well to do and more rarely follow their 
husbands to operational zones.  
 
In addition to army wives, we also interviewed a range of other civilian groups (here 
used as a generic term for non-service or non-armed group members), such as small-
scale economic operators and local authorities, focusing on their understandings and 
experiences of army wives. We conducted these interviews in order to examine the 
expectations and ideals emerging from (other) civilians vis-à-vis army wives, since 
these form an integral part of technologies of governing. Moreover, these interviews 
helped unearth a range of often illicit practices enacted by army wives that they do not 
readily speak about themselves, but which are crucial for understanding their agency.  
 
Certainly, this research set-up is problematic since it somehow reproduces the very 
civilian/military divide, as well as the ambiguous position of army wives vis-à-vis that 
divide, which this article problematizes. Yet, drawing from previous experience, we 
believed that talking to army wives and ‘other civilians’ simultaneously would have 
had an inhibiting effect, producing mainly poised and accommodated narratives that 
reflect efforts to display an air of politeness – triggered also by our presence as 
(white, Northern) researchers. Moreover, while the chosen set-up perhaps provoked 
the articulation of stereotyped representations of both the FARDC and their wives, 
reflecting the tendency to present self-images of victimhood in relation to us as 
outside researchers, this set-up did not – as we will demonstrate – preclude more 
nuanced representations of army wives. Such nuancing enables both the liminal 
position of army wives and their exercise of agency. 
 
Military efforts to govern army wives  
 
The (self)governing of army wives and the ways this promotes and draws upon their 
militarization are in part shaped by the military organization as a whole; individual 																																																								
3 Judith Verweijen has conducted ethnographic research among FARDC units and civilian populations 
in the Kivu provinces since 2010. Maria Eriksson Baaz, together with Maria Stern, held interviews 
with FARDC personnel between 2004 and 2013 for various research projects, addressing gender 
discourses, sexual violence, and defense reform interventions. 
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army personnel, notably their husbands; and associations of army wives, which are 
commonly established per military unit (regiment, brigade) or at camps and bases. 
This section describes the governing efforts of these various military and military-
linked actors. We first account for the construction of the desired object of 
government by querying into the constitution of the heavily (but ambiguously) 
gendered ideal army wife. Subsequently, we look at the techniques of governing 
employed to mould army wives into these idealized shapes, probing into the ways in 
which they are called upon (both as civilians and military). 
The ideal army wife 
 
In many ways, notions of the ideal army wife reflect ideals of family relations, 
femininity, and masculinity that find currency within Congolese society as a whole. 
While highly diverse and fluid (depending on socio-economic position and time-space 
context), such ideals centre on the familiar biblical images of the husband as the just, 
wise provider and the head of the family, and the wife as a virtuous, orderly, 
committed spouse and mother, who respects and cares for her husband (Hollander 
2014). As in many other settings, the plethora of churches active in the country, and 
other institutions such as schools and the core family, are important sources of these 
idealized notions. Through the activities of army chaplains, this idealized imagery of 
family and gender relations also finds its way into the army directly.  
 
While reflecting general images of gender and family, in the military setting these 
notions gain particular purchase and twist by the frequent invocation of military ranks 
and hierarchies. This is especially clear in articulations of ideal relations between 
army wives and husbands, with for instance the husband being symbolized as a 
general/colonel/commander and the wife as a lower ranking soldier or subordinate, or 
in the case of female military personnel married to other soldiers, a gardecorps 
(bodyguard). The salience of military metaphors and practices in depicting marital 
relations is also mirrored in assertions by army wives and female army personnel that 
they are better wives (compared to civilians) in that they, having been socialized into 
the military hierarchy, know how to properly show respect for their husbands 
(Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013). This illustrates how, aside from by general 
representations of ideal wives in the DRC, idealized notions of army wives are also 
shaped by and attached to particular military ideals, which are ‘transferred’ to 
spouses. These ideals are mostly connected to (familiar) military notions of control, 
discipline and obedience, and of knowing to be humble/subservient (mikitisa) – which 
are contrasted with discursive constructions of ‘civilians’ (and ‘bad’ women/wives) as 
embodying disorder, and living a life devoid of respect, morality and obedience 
(Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2008).  
 
Two aspects of such military ideals/expectations are particularly prominent. The first 
is that military wives are expected not only to obey military orders, but also to respect 
the military hierarchy, including outside the home. As we will demonstrate further 
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below, a good army wife needs to know and show proper respect for the ranks of 
military personnel and treat their wives accordingly, reflecting the ways in which 
army wives fulfill central functions of ‘role preservation’ in the military (Harrell 
2001). The second aspect is that a good army wife, like military personnel 
themselves, is expected to stay out of ‘troublesome’ behaviour – notably, breaking 
with the military code. As in other contexts (cf. Segal 1986; Harrell 2001), such 
behaviour is generally construed as casting a shadow not only on the character of the 
individual husband/serviceman, but also on his unit as a whole. As one army wife put 
it: 
 
We have to know how to behave with humility and respect. Because we 
are wives of the military. The way we behave is important. If people see 
that you are disrespectful, gossipy (songi-songi) and getting in trouble all 
the time, they will think ‘ah, this commander is a bad one, he has no 
discipline’. 4 
 
Together with the general tendency to see one service member as representing the 
military as a whole, these dynamics allow for the transformation of 
‘unruly/troublesome’ behavior of army wives from a ‘personal/private/civilian’ to a 
‘public/military’ concern (cf. Gray 2016; Harrison and Laliberté 1994).  Similarly, 
army wives’ good behaviour – interpreted as a sign of a harmonious home life that is 
the product of the husband’s management – is seen to provide evidence for 
commanders’ leadership skills. As concluded by a chief warrant officer ‘if he [the 
commander] can’t take care of his family, he can’t take care of his unit’.5 This reflects 
the porosity of and complex interactions between the public/private, family/unit, 
civilian/military divides also found in many other military contexts globally (cf. 
Harrell 2001; Gray 2015, 2016). 
 
The civilian and military ideals described above translate into specific expectations 
attached to army wives related to the enactment of certain tasks and duties. Like 
elsewhere, Congolese army wives perform a variety of (formal and informal), highly 
gendered duties for their husbands, which are crucial for military functioning. These 
include what Wool and Messinger (2012) call ‘labours of love’; the complex and 
intense caregiving to spouses who have been injured in the line of duty, often 
involving injuries that require long-term rehabilitation or lead to handicaps. 
Additionally, Congolese army wives perform what Harrell (2001, 59) terms ‘morale, 
public relations (PR) and ceremonial’ duties. For instance, on 8 March, International 
Women’s Day (an official holiday in the DRC), military spouses take part in the 
annual women’s parade, where women from various organizations and spheres of 
social life march in distinct sections, wearing the specific pagne (cloth) that 
distinguishes their group. In the context of this parade, military spouses are clearly 																																																								
4 Interview, Sange, October 2014. 
5 Interview, Beni, April, 2014.	
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seen as ‘representing’ the military, both by the institution and by civilians. This 
testifies to their ‘ceremonial’ and PR roles, and how they are seen as an extension of 
the military. Another illustration of this is that they often complement the football 
team of female soldiers that traditionally plays against female police as part of the 8 
March festivities.  
 
Other tasks performed by Congolese army wives relate to what may be called 
logistical functions that are crucial to the military’s reproduction, or, in the words of 
Enloe (2000, 40): ‘tasks that any large military force needs but wants to keep 
ideologically peripheral to its combat function and often tries to avoid paying for 
directly’. In the Congolese context, this includes cooking, fetching water and 
firewood, washing husbands’ uniforms, and constructing huts in new locations. 
While, expectedly, these contributions are mainly framed as ‘any household duties’ 
and therefore downplayed by the hierarchy and military personnel (cf. Enloe 2000), 
they crucially compensate for the FARDC’s deficient infrastructure, logistics, and 
social service provision to its personnel.  
 
Military techniques of government 
 
The idealized imagery and expectations presented above are at the core of military 
techniques of governing army wives. These techniques consist of a range of practices, 
including direct disciplinary interventions and socializing efforts. The harshest 
disciplining takes place where military spouses publicly defy the military 
organization, such as when staging public protests against delays in the disbursement 
of their husbands’ salary, or other bad service conditions. Such manifestations, which 
take place in a context where any form of unionization by army personnel is strictly 
forbidden, are doubly embarrassing for the military. Not only do they show 
‘disorderly conduct’ and overt protest against military policies, they also expose the 
sub-standard service conditions of military personnel. Such bad publicity explains 
why manifestations often invite direct repression. For example when in December 
2013, the wives of soldiers of the 1011th regiment barricaded the bridge leading up to 
Uvira town, to protest months of salary arrears, they were immediately dispersed by 
Military Police in a heavy-handed manner (Radio Okapi 2013).  
 
Direct disciplinary interventions are also enacted by ‘Bureau 5’, the department of the 
general staff of military units that is charged with social affairs, including family 
issues and civil-military relations. Where military spouses are in conflict with each 
other or with civilians, or display ‘improper behaviour’, the S5 (staff officer of 
Bureau 5) intervenes to settle the affair. In many cases, husbands are held accountable 
for the behaviour of their spouses, which creates incentives for them to ‘teach their 
wives proper conduct’. Interventions by Bureau 5 are particularly frequent when it 
concerns conflicts with civilians, which are mostly unwanted by the military 
hierarchy as they are feared to taint the image of the unit as a whole. This, again, may 
have detrimental side effects on military operations, by prompting civilians to 
	 13	
withhold crucial information or refuse the contributions in cash or in kind that the 
military commonly collects in the name of facilitating combat action (Verweijen 
2015). 
 
In addition to Bureau 5, another important institution for ensuring proper conduct is 
associations of army wives, which are generally led by the wives of senior 
commanders. How active these associations are and how they function (regularity of 
meetings; tasks performed, etc.) is highly variable, depending on unit command and 
women’s own initiatives. Common tasks performed by these groups, which are 
roughly similar to the Family Support/Readiness Groups in the US Army (see Harrell 
2001), are disseminating important information about the unit, giving assistance in 
times of crises (e.g. fund–raising and organization in relation to illness and funerals), 
providing marital advice, and resolving conflicts between army wives and (other) 
civilians.  
 
Aside from providing assistance, associations of army wives are also vehicles of 
socialization, organizing meetings where the wives of senior commanders instruct 
others how to behave properly as military spouses, thereby ensuring their ‘correct 
behavior and fulfillment of expectations’ (Harrell 2001, 62). The messages diffused in 
those gatherings – and the ways in which army wives are called upon as both civilians 
and military – reveal how the liminal position of army wives is crucial to efforts to 
govern them. On the one hand, these communications interpellate army wives’ 
military identities. As a president of an association of military wives explained: 
 
We give them instructions (toli), how we as wives of soldiers should live 
with wives of civilians. How we as wives of the military are supposed to 
live with people. To also show respect amongst ourselves. To know who is 
the wife of whom [soldier]. To know that her husband has a higher rank 
than mine. To teach them how to obey/show respect (kotosa) […] Some 
wives are like ‘I am the wife of an adjudant (warrant officer), but I am 
better, I dress better than you who are a wife of a major’. No, that kind of 
behavior we forbid! You need to obey her/show respect, because she is a 
wife of a senior rank. That is what we teach them. 6 
 
This citation reflects the central role of the notions of respect, obedience and being 
humble, in particular by showing respect for the hierarchy and chain of command, 
while also expressing the idea of wives as having ‘preserving roles’ and as ‘wearing’ 
their husbands’ rank. Hence, military wives are situated here as part of the military 
institution, and as crucial for reproducing military imagery and discourse. Yet, on the 
other hand, the teachings diffused by associations of army wives call upon these 
women’s civilian positionalities. As the same president explained, another message 
constantly repeated in gatherings of army wives is that they are civilians:  																																																								
6 Interview, Luvungi, October 2014. 
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We wives of soldiers are not soldiers. We are civilians (raia). We cannot 
take the power (kimokonzi) of our husbands and make it our own. They are 
the soldiers. We wives are civilians. And we need to know how to live 
with our civilian sisters and brothers (bandeko na biso baraia). To go to 
the water pump and make demands saying ‘don’t you know I am the wife 
of a soldier!?’. No, that is not the way to do it. Soldiers are [our] men and 
you as a wife/mother (bamaman), you are a civilian.7 
 
Such teachings, aiming to keep army wives from engaging in ‘troublesome 
behaviour’, clearly interpellate the civilian identities of army wives. Army wives are 
here reminded that they are like any other civilian with no special privileges, having 
no right to exert power in the name of the military. These exhortations should be seen 
in the light of the specific position and reputation of the Congolese armed forces, 
which, as described above, are often associated with a ‘misuse of military power’ – or 
the claiming of privileges like free transport and food contributions from civilians 
based on their status as ‘military’ (Verweijen 2015).  
 
Hence, and paradoxically, army wives are simultaneously reminded of their civilian 
status –having to refrain from usurping military power – and called upon to embody 
military ideals. Furthermore, whereas in the first example military wives are 
constructed as part of the military organization, in the second they are situated outside 
the military, as civilians. This shows how military wives are placed in an ambiguous 
position in which they are both/neither military and/or civilians and in which they – in 
their position as civilians – should still embody the military traits of restraint and 
control, in contrast to other civilians who are associated with unruly behaviour. Such 
ambiguity reveals how liminality – being ‘in between’ civilian and military worlds  – 
forms an integral part of efforts to govern military wives. As we will discuss in the 
next section, liminality also occupies a crucial position in the ways army wives are 
governed in ‘civilian’ contexts. 
 
Civilian interpellations: constructing army wives in ‘civilian contexts’ 
 
How then do civilians imagine and call upon army wives’ subjectivities?  From the 
interviews, it emerged that while civilians tend to recognize military wives’ civilian 
status, they often frame them simply as military, based on their alleged self-
attributions. As one focus group participant commented: ‘They consider themselves to 
be soldiers’ (banajikamata sawa vile biko basoda).8 Yet, while for the military and 
their wives, the meanings attached to ‘the military’ (especially when juxtaposed to 
‘civilians’) predominantly echo official narratives on the nature and role of the armed 
forces (e.g. ‘protecting citizens/civilians and their goods’ and ‘defending territorial 																																																								
7 Interview, Luvungi, October 2014. 
8 Focus group discussion, Sange, October 2014. 
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integrity’), in civilian discourse, the Congolese military bears connotations of 
asociality, thugishness, and violence. Thus, soldiers are portrayed as batu ya pamba 
(losers), mendiants (beggars), miyibi or bamwizi (thieves), and as misbehaving 
savages (sauvage) with violent/aggressive tendencies (mkali) (see also Verweijen 
2015; Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2008). 
 
This stereotyped imagery is also reflected in civilians’ narratives on FARDC wives, in 
particular of the rank and file. The latter are represented as being ‘militarized’ in the 
sense of inhabiting the same traits and displaying the same behaviour historically 
associated with the Congolese armed forces. Thus, they are depicted as difficult, 
hotheaded, and aggressive, and as having contempt for civilians. As expressed by one 
civilian: ‘They brag about themselves (kujipiga ku kifuwa), saying “we are wives of 
the military, you can do us nothing”’.9 Furthermore, many civilians described how, 
similar to their husbands, army wives use their military status to impose themselves 
on civilians: ‘Wives of the military often have a big mouth (banakuwa na domo) at 
the mill and at the water tap. They like to quarrel with civilian women, they are very 
arrogant (kiburi).’10 Others narrated how they engage in illicit activities like stealing: 
‘They go into several fields where they often destroy the crops, and steal manioc and 
sweet potatoes […] this leads to conflicts’.11 
 
Portrayals of army wives as inhabiting the same characteristics as their husbands (e.g. 
aggression and a penchant for coercion/imposition) reflect a masculinization of army 
wives in civilian discourse. Yet army wives are simultaneously depicted as women in 
a manner that echoes representations of women in/associated with armed forces more 
generally, including those serving in the FARDC (Eriksson Baaz and Stern 2013). 
Such representations are marked by classic forms of sexualization and ‘whore 
narratives’ (e.g. Enloe 2000; Sjoberg and Gentry 2007) as evidenced by descriptions 
of army wives as femmes légères (facile women), or bamayala or ndumba (whores in 
Swahili and Lingala). This promiscuous behaviour is seen as stemming both from 
their alleged (masculinized and depraved) lust/sexuality and from poverty (forcing 
them to engage in survival sex). Consequently, liaising with army wives is portrayed 
as dangerous. Similar ideas are expressed in various popular expressions and songs, 
like ‘Toi et Moi’ by the famous singer Fally Ipupa, in which he sings that ‘wives of 
soldiers are not for civilians to try to master/dominate’ (mwasi ya soda aza muntu te 
po civil amataka)’.  
 
While many of the civilians interviewed articulated the stereotyped, negative 
representations described above, therefore constructing army wives as part of the 
armed forces, this was only one dimension of their discourses. In fact, civilian 
framings of army wives proved highly ambiguous, being contingent on time-space 
context but also varying within one conversation, depending on the discursive setting 																																																								
9 Focus group discussion, Sange, October 2014. 
10 Focus group discussion, Runingu, October 2014. 
11 Focus group discussion, Runingu, October 2014. 
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(cf. Verweijen 2015). Thus, many civilians emphasized that one cannot talk about 
army wives as one group and refused to make generalizing statements, highlighting 
these women’s heterogeneity. In the words of one woman:  
 
Among them [army wives] there are good ones and bad ones. There are 
army wives that we have a mutual understanding with (tunaelewana). There 
are other wives of civilians who are aggressive and are arrogant, and we 
dislike each other (munachukiana). It are not only wives of soldiers who are 
bad (wabaya).12 
 
Such more nuanced opinions often alluded to the liminal status of army wives, 
emphasizing they were not part of the military, but civilians like them. Yet, as 
reflected in the citation above, while problematizing the distinctions between military 
and civilian (wives), such representations were often still haunted by FARDC wives’ 
association with the military. Indeed, by saying it is not only wives of soldiers who 
are bad, it is somehow still implied that they are bad. In this way, the representations 
of army wives as ‘also civilians’ continued to be tainted by their supposedly military 
status and the imagery ascribed to that position. Such imagery and associations are, as 
we will see below, crucial for making sense of the ways in which army wives 
sometimes fervently emphasize their civilian status. This evokes the question how 
army wives themselves invest and disinvest into the subject positions allotted to them, 
thereby (re)producing and (re)assembling the self.   
 
Tactically reversing militarization 
 
Army wives’ subjectivities not only reflect the ambiguous civilian/military status 
assigned to them in the governing configurations in which they are situated – from 
both discursive and social practices – they also ‘tactically reverse’ (Foucault 1997, 
185) the subject positions allocated to them, drawing on the very ambiguity 
surrounding their status.13 Clearly, this is not such a linear or consciously engineered 
process as the language of tactics presupposes, reflecting  the difficulties of separating 
‘the agency of those being governed’ from technologies of government. 
 
Many army wives talked about themselves as being civilians, arguing that there is no 
difference between them and other civilians. This positioning as civilians partly 
reflects the workings of military efforts to govern army wives, often echoing the 
teachings they receive from the military and associations of army wives. As one army 
wife put it: ‘We are not military. We are wives of the FARDC. That is different (eza 
ndenge moko te). We are civilians’. 14 Yet self-portrayals as civilians also reflect the 
workings of civilian interpellations. During the interviews, army wives would 																																																								
12 Focus group discussion, Uvira, October 2014. 
13 We are indebted to Kasper Hoffmann for drawing our attention to tactical reversal in Foucault’s 
work.  
14 Interview, Luberizi, October 2014.	
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articulate their civilian status particularly strongly when we talked about how civilians 
represent them, rendering such emphasis a seeming response to the negative attributes 
attached to army wives by civilians. For instance, after concluding that civilians hold 
many stereotypes about army wives, one interviewee continued:  
 
We are women, like all other women. Our men are also just men, with 
the needs of other men [laughing]. We are all the children of God. We 
have the same worries and struggles to feed our families and our 
children. Really we are the same (tozali ndenge moko).15  
 
However, while military wives often highlighted their status as civilians, they also 
talked about themselves as military and as fundamentally different from (other) 
civilian women – in ways that both contained and surpassed the military identities 
(also) assigned to them. Many of the accounts in which army wives situated 
themselves as ‘somehow military’ were grounded in stories of the particularities of 
being an army wife, such as always living in fear of death and fatal injuries, leading a 
nomadic life, always being a visitor and outsider etc. – resonating with the 
experiences of army wives living in military camps overseas (Segal 1986; Hyde 
2015). As one army wife put it: 
 
We have a different life [compared to the civilians here]. We are like 
visitors (bapaya). They have their families and all the relations here and 
they never travel. We go here and there. And our families are far away. If I 
need advice or support … it is difficult, because my family is so far 
away.16  
 
Army wives sometimes also articulated a more military identity by reiterating the 
need for respect for the military hierarchy and to lead a life marked by discipline and 
control, echoing the military position allotted to them by the military institution. For 
instance, some emphasized the particular challenges of living in civilian 
neighbourhoods, arguing that it is not good that civilians are let into the secrets of the 
life of the military.  
 
In other cases, however, military identities were invoked in ways that clearly 
surpassed those acknowledged and assigned by the military institution. One important 
manner in which this occurred was by highlighting that army wives perform 
important functions for the army, thereby forming part of it. This contribution was 
often situated in the context of critique of the government for failing to properly 
provide for military personnel and their families. In the words of one army wife: 
 
																																																								
15 Interview, Sange, October 2014. 
16 Interview, Luberizi, October 2014.	
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We are part of the army. Because we provide what the government fails to 
provide. The government does nothing! (eloko te). So we do it. We do lots 
of work. And we keep their morale high and give our husbands comfort 
and courage. Really we are also serving this nation (tozoservir ekolo). But 
we are not recognized. The new government says we do not exist!17  
 
As reflected in this citation, army wives’ claims to a military status and corresponding 
entitlements clearly draw upon the range of gendered and largely unacknowledged 
duties performed ‘for’ the army, as described earlier. Moreover, these claims feed into 
occasional resistance against the military organization, such as demonstrations to 
denounce the poor service conditions, showing how they shape and are shaped by 
‘transgressive’ military subjectivities, whereby army wives fail to inhabit/resist 
inhabiting the positions allotted to them by military teachings. 
 
Similar claims, grounded in a self-attributed military status, also translate into certain 
expectations vis-à-vis civilians. As the wife of a captain stated: ‘Today, civilians 
should respect us, as we also fight in all manners against the enemy (adui), together 
with the soldiers’.18 Such expectations also sometimes feed into ‘unwanted’ behaviour 
in interactions with civilians such as demanding special privileges and exemptions. 
These include asking for better conditions at civilian hospitals (e.g. a bed in a better 
ward or being treated first) or during transport (refusing a seat on the deck of a ship 
where one is exposed to the sun), or jumping the line for tapping water. A military 
status is also invoked in army wives’ income-generating activities, providing similar 
exceptions and protection as to FARDC personnel. For example, when asking if she 
paid the taxe d’étalage (display tax) at the market, one army spouse commented: ‘We 
do not need to pay, for we are the wives of the military’.19 However, there is no 
formal rule that exempts army wives from paying these taxes, revealing how this is 
self-attributed privilege. Additionally, army wives make use of their association with 
the military for engaging in illegal economic activities like selling prohibited alcohol; 
unauthorized logging for charcoal production; running ‘black markets’ (selling 
merchandise from their houses, which is officially forbidden); or traffic in outlawed 
goods such as cannabis. Wary to get into trouble with the military, and often 
demanding a fee in return, civilian authorities and security services generally refrain 
from trying to stop or punish such activities  (Eriksson Baaz and Verweijen 2016).  
 
When claiming privileges or exemptions from legislation and rules, army wives 
perform a military identity that sits uncomfortably with the military values they are 
expected to incarnate by the military organization. At the same time, when carrying 
out tasks that subvert the civilian order, they often act in concert with their husbands, 
for instance selling the meat of the livestock that the latter have stolen. Since 																																																								
17 Interview, Luberizi, October 2014. 
18 Interview, Bukavu, May 2015.  
19 Interview, Lemera, October 2015. 
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husbands expect their wives to assist them, including by facilitating illicit activities, 
performing such tasks is also a way in which they (as expected) act as extension of 
and support to their husbands. Yet this does not imply that they act merely out of 
imposition. Many of the army wives engaged in illegal activities stated they simply 
prefer these types of revenue generation as they yield more money, or entail less hard 
labour than the alternatives.  
 
While sometimes acting out a more ‘military’ role in everyday interactions with 
civilians, in other contexts or moments, army wives were observed to profile 
themselves more explicitly as civilians. Such ‘civilian performances’ appear 
particularly frequent when army wives, who often live in rented houses among 
civilians, are in need of assistance with household chores, child care, and money. 
Following the mutual solidarity generally displayed by those living in the same 
(civilian) neighbourhood, such urgencies often prompt them to address their 
neighbours, leading them to being invoked and perceived as any other neighbour in 
need of help.  As one army wife, painting a contrast to the inhospitable attitude 
displayed by military neighbours in overcrowded army camps, explained: ‘If my child 
becomes ill […]. I go and borrow money from the neighbours, they help me […] It is 
better to live among civilians. Because your neighbour will at least respect you 
(banakuheshimia) [….]’.20  
 
Even when engaging in illegal activities enabled by their ‘military’ status, army wives 
may still engage in more ‘civilian’ performances. For example, an army widow 
involved in the cannabis trade told one of us that when travelling to Fizi in order to 
buy the stuff, she tended to use the same drivers: ‘When you know the driver, you go 
all the time with the same car. When I have 5000FC they will understand and many 
know my case (banajua cas yangu)’.21 As she explained, this implied they knew that 
she was a widow with many dependent children and had little money, therefore 
allowing her to pay lower tariffs for transport. Hence, to enable her cannabis trading 
activities, this woman drew at once upon her (indirect) association with the army, to 
prevent being busted by the security services, and her social role and status as widow 
and single mother (being construed as more ‘civilian’ within this particular setting). 
 
The above examples provide some insights into how the agency of army spouses 
draws upon the liminal space in	 between civilian and military worlds, through the 
selective appropriation and deployment of allotted statuses and identities in discursive 
and social practices, allowing these women to ‘tactically reverse’ the militarization 
they are subjected to. These oscillations between subject positions and social role 
performances are not a unique feature of army wives. Rather, they reflect the ‘tactic’ 
agency of social agents in unstable social terrains more generally, where flexibly 
enacting and deploying forms of identification and discursive repertoires is key to 																																																								
20 Interview, Bukavu, May 2015. 
21 Interview, Uvira, October 2014. 
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charting paths of action, or what Vigh (2006) calls ‘social navigation’. Yet the 
inherent liminality of ‘army wives’, as (re)produced by the ambiguous framings and 
corresponding ways to govern them as both/neither civilians and/nor military, 
arguably enlarges the space for tactical reversals and redeployments, rendering the 
always incomplete project of militarization even more tenuous.  
 
Concluding reflections  
 
This article has attended to the governing arrangements surrounding army wives in 
the DRC. We have shown the crucial import of army wives’ liminality – their status 
in between civilian and military worlds  – both in arrangements to govern them and in 
their own agency within these arrangements. Army wives are called upon as both 
civilians and military in highly ambiguous manners. For instance, they are expected 
by the military organization to inhabit military ideals of control and restraint by 
interpellations to their both/either/alternating civilian and military identities, being in 
some contexts constructed as part of the military organization, but in others situated 
outside of it, as civilians.  
 
While recognizing the inherently difficult task of analysing the governing of the self, 
the article has provided hints into the ways in which Congolese army wives invest and 
disinvest into the subject positions allotted to them. In particular, it has shown how 
their subjectivities both reflect and subvert the ambiguous civilian/military statuses 
they are ascribed – by tactically reversing and (re)deploying them – thereby drawing 
on the spaces between civilian and military significations and their layered 
connotations. In this manner, Congolese army wives both are agents of and resist 
militarization.  
 
These findings raise questions about the nature of militarization that go beyond the 
context of the DRC. Analysing militarization through the lens of governmentality not 
only focuses attention on the dispersed nature of the governing arrangements 
propelling this process, it also highlights its contingent nature, including the non-
necessary and non-linear connection to the functioning of the military institution. 
Furthermore, it demonstrates the crucial role of the ‘civilian’ dimension within 
processes of militarization (cf. Wool 2015): it is through civilian (often stereotypical) 
discourses on ‘the military’, through civilian institutions, frameworks and standards 
that ‘the military’ is created and recreated (cf. Mitchell 1991), which is again a 
precondition for reinforcing and extending the power of the discourses, rationalities, 
and practices framed as ‘military’. Additionally, by highlighting that the imprint of 
military elements on subjectification is by no means a straightforward or necessary 
process, free from tactical re-appropriations and reversions, a governmentality 
approach points to the importance of agency within processes of militarization, in 
particular the agency of ‘those being militarized’.  
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By demonstrating the relevance of studying Congolese army wives with an analytical 
toolbox often reserved for so called ‘advanced militaries’, and by revealing numerous 
similarities between the Congolese and ‘Northern’ contexts, we have tried to realize 
our postcolonial ambition, articulated at the outset of this article, to counter at once 
the Euro/US-centrism that marks present-day (critical) military studies, and the 
colonial framing of African armed forces common to a range of disciplines. Yet we 
have certainly also failed in this postcolonial endeavour. Above all, we have written 
about Congolese army wives in a way that reflects our academic interests. We have 
picked only parts of their stories, parts that intrigue us and, supposedly, the readers of 
this article (other critical military scholars). Walking down familiar and highly 
problematic paths (reflecting also the common disinterest in materiality in such 
scholarship) we have simply glossed over what the army wives told us that they 
wanted us to write about – their dire living conditions – turning that instead into 
marginal ‘necessary contextual information’. As such, we have certainly ‘failed to 
listen’ and are reproducing the very privilege that we as post-colonial scholars claim 
to oppose.  
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